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A SIMPLE GENERALIZATION OF THE ELGAMAL
CRYPTOSYSTEM TO NON-ABELIAN GROUPS II
AYAN MAHALANOBIS
ABSTRACT. This is a study of the MOR cryptosystem using the special
linear group over finite fields. The automorphism group of the special
linear group is analyzed for this purpose. At our current state of knowl-
edge, I show that this MOR cryptosystem has better security than the
ElGamal cryptosystem over finite fields.
1. INTRODUCTION
The MOR cryptosystem is a generalization of the ElGamal cryptosystem,
where the discrete logarithm problem works in the automorphism group of
a group G, instead of the group G itself. The framework for the MOR
cryptosystem was first proposed in Crypto2001 by Paeng et al. [13]. Ma-
halanobis [10] used the group of unitriangular matrices for the MOR cryp-
tosystem. That effort was successful, the MOR cryptosystem over the group
of unitriangular matrices over Fq is as secure as the ElGamal cryptosystem
over the finite field Fq.
In this paper we study the MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q). If we as-
sume, that the only way to break the proposed MOR cryptosystem, is to
solve the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism group; then it
follows that the proposed MOR cryptosystem is as secure as the ElGamal
cryptosystem over Fqd .
This is a major improvement. This MOR cryptosystem works with ma-
trices of degree d over Fq. To encrypt(decrypt) a plaintext(ciphertext) one
works over the field Fq. To break this cryptosystem, one has to solve a dis-
crete logarithm problem in Fqd . Even for a small positive integer d, this
provides us with a considerable security advantage.
There are some challenges in the implementation of this cryptosystem.
Implementing matrix multiplication is hard. Though we have not reached
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 94A60, 20G40.
Key words and phrases. MOR cryptosystem, special linear groups, the discrete loga-
rithm problem.
1
the optimum speed for that [4], it might always stay harder than multiplica-
tion in a finite field. So one needs to find an optimum strategy to present the
automorphisms and the underlying group for the MOR cryptosystem, see
Section 8 for more details. The key-size for this MOR cryptosystem is big,
compared with the conventional ElGamal cryptoystem.
At the end, I provide parameters for the proposed MOR cryptosystem. I
suspect that the parameters are too conservative and the degree of the matrix
is unnecessarily big. The overly conservative estimates are to show that for
chosen parameters, the MOR cryptosystem is almost as secure as the ElGa-
mal cryptosystem over elliptic curves using fields of same size; the golden
standard in public key cryptography. For most practical purposes, the de-
gree of the matrix can be chosen smaller. However the key-size for this
MOR cryptosystem is larger than that of the ElGamal over elliptic curves.
2. THE MOR CRYPTOSYSTEM
This section contains a bare-bone description of the MOR cryptosys-
tem [13], see also [12]. A description and a critical analysis of the MOR
cryptosystem is also in [10] and the references there.
2.1. Description of the MOR cryptosystem. Let G = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gτ 〉,
τ ∈ N be a finite group and φ a non-trivial (public) automorphism of G.
Alice’s keys are as follows:
Private Key: m, m ∈ N.
Public Key: {φ(gi)}τi=1 and {φm(gi)}
τ
i=1.
Encryption.
a: To send a message (plaintext) a ∈ G Bob computes φr and φmr for
a random r ∈ N.
b: The ciphertext is ({φr(gi)}τi=1 , φmr(a)).
Decryption.
a: Alice knows m, so if she receives the ciphertext (φr, φmr(a)), she
computes φmr from φr and then φ−mr and then computes a from
φmr(a).
If Alice has the information necessary to find the order of the automorphism
φ, then she can use the identity φt−1 = φ−1 whenever φt = 1 to compute
φ−mr . Also, she can find the order of some subgroup in which φ belongs
and use the same identity. However, the smaller the subgroup, more efficient
the decryption algorithm.
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3. THE UNIMODULAR GROUP OF DEGREE d OVER Fq
The group SL(d, q) is the set of all matrices of degree d with determinant
1. It is well known that SL(d, q) is a normal subgroup of GL(d, q) the group
of non-singular matrices of degree d over Fq. In this article I consider Fq to
be a finite extension of the prime field Zp of degree γ where γ ≥ 1.
Definition 1. For distinct ordered pair (i, j), define a matrix unit ei,j as a
matrix of degree d, such that, all entries in ei,j are 0, except the intersection
of the ith row and the jth column; which is 1 (the identity in the field Fq).
Matrices of the form 1 + λei,j , λ ∈ F×q and i 6= j are called the elementary
matrices or elementary transvections. Here 1 is the identity matrix of degree
d. I shall abuse the notation a little bit and use 1 for the identity of the field
and the matrix group simultaneously.
It is known that the group SL(d, q) is generated by elementary transvec-
tions [14, Theorem 8.8]. The fundamental relations between the elementary
transvections are the relations in the field and the ones stated below:
[1 + λei,j, 1 + µek,l] =


1 + λµei,l if j = k, i 6= l
1− λµek,j if i = l, j 6= k
1 otherwise
(1)
(1 + λei,j) (1 + µei,j) = 1 + (λ+ µ) ei,j(2)
(1 + λei,j)
−1 = (1− λei,j)(3)
(1 + λei,j)
k = 1 + kλei,j k ∈ N(4)
where λ, µ ∈ Fq.
4. AUTOMORPHISMS OF THE UNIMODULAR GROUP OVER Fq
It is well known that the automorphisms of SL(d, q) are generated by the
following [3, 5, 17]:
Diagonal Automorphism: This is conjugation by a non-scalar diag-
onal matrix. Notice that: since all diagonal matrices are not of de-
terminant 1, the diagonal matrices are often not in SL(d, q). So a
diagonal automorphism is not always an inner automorphism.
Inner Automorphism: This is the most well known automorphism of
a non-abelian group G, defined by x 7→ g−1xg for g ∈ G.
Graph Automorphism: The graph automorphism induces the map
A 7→ (A−1)
T
, A ∈ SL(d, q). Clearly, graph automorphisms are
involutions, i.e., of order two and are not inner automorphisms.
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Field Automorphism: This automorphisms is the action of a field au-
tomorphism of the underlying field to the individual entries of a ma-
trix.
In this section, I am interested in a special class of inner automorphisms,
“the permutation automorphisms”. For a permutation automorphism the
conjugator g in the inner automorphism is a permutation matrix. It is well
known that for a permutation matrix P , det(P ) = ±1 and P−1 = P T . The
permutation matrix is constructed by taking the identity matrix 1 and then
exchanging the rows based on some permutation α. If the permutation α
is even then the determinant of P is 1 otherwise it is −1. Note that if the
determinant is −1, then conjugation by that permutation matrix is not an
inner automorphism; but it is close to being one and I will treat it like an
inner automorphism in this paper.
4.0.1. Effect of a permutation automorphism on an elementary transvec-
tions. If A is an elementary transvection, i.e., A = 1 + λei,j and P be a
permutation matrix, then P−1AP = 1 + λeα−1(i),α−1(j).
4.0.2. Effect of a diagonal automorphism on an elementary transvection.
Let D = [w1, w2, . . . , wd] be a diagonal matrix. If A = 1 + λei,j then
D−1AD = 1+ (w−1i λwj)ei,j . Let us fix a (i, j) such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, then
look at the root subgroup 〈1 + λei,j〉, λ ∈ Fq and i 6= j. This subgroup is
clearly isomorphic to F+q .
Assume for a moment that I am using the MOR cryptosystem as de-
scribed in Section 2.1 with G as the root subgroup defined above and φ as a
diagonal automorphism. Then clearly for some k ∈ F×q .
φ : 1 + ei,j 7→ 1 + kei,j
φm : 1 + ei,j 7→ 1 + k
mei,j.
Clearly we see that this MOR cryptosystem is equivalent to the ElGamal
cryptosystem over finite fields. Since SL(d, q) is generated by elementary
transvections, I claim that using the diagonal automorphisms of the special
linear groups over finite fields, the MOR cryptosystem is identical to the El-
Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields. It is reasonable to assume that there
are other automorphisms, composition of which with the diagonal automor-
phisms will provide us with better security.
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4.0.3. The effect of the graph automorphism on an elementary transvection.
It is easy to see from the definition of the graph automorphism that if A =
1 + λei,j then (A−1)T = 1− λej,i.
4.0.4. The effect of field automorphisms on an elementary transvections. It
is well known that the field automorphisms form a cyclic group generated
by the Frobenius automorphism of the field Fq, given by λ 7→ λp, where p
is the characteristic of the field Fq. Then the action of field automorphism
on an elementary transvection is 1 + λei,j 7→ 1 + λp
s
ei,j where 1 ≤ s < γ.
5. MOR WITH MONOMIAL AUTOMORPHISMS
Assume for a moment that I am only using the composition of a diago-
nal and an inner automorphism of SL(d, q), i.e., I am using MOR (Section
2.1) where φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 where φ1 is a diagonal automorphism and φ2 is a
permutation automorphism. Then clearly φ is a monomial automorphism,
conjugation by a monomial matrix. The diagonal automorphism φ1 changes
1 + ei,j to 1 + λi,jei,j for some λi,j ∈ F×q . Note that the λi,j depends on the
diagonal automorphism and once the diagonal automorphism is fixed λi,j is
also fixed for a particular (i, j). The permutation automorphism φ2 changes
1 + λi,jei,j to 1 + λi,jeβ(i),β(j) where β = α−1. Here α is the permuta-
tion that gives rise to the permutation matrix P , used in the permutation
automorphism.
I now look at the action of the exponentiation of the automorphism φ =
φ1 ◦ φ2 on the elementary transvection 1 + ei,j . Notice that if
(5) φ : 1 + ei,j diagonal−−−−→ 1 + λi,jei,j permutation−−−−−−→ 1 + λi,jeβ(i),β(j),
then
(6) φm : 1 + ei,j −−−→ 1 +
m∏
l=1
λβl(i)βl(j)eβm(i),βm(j)
Now let us assume that the order of β, ◦(β) = ν then
φν : 1 + ei,j 7→ 1 +
ν∏
l=1
λβl(i)βl(j)ei,j .
This shows that a cycle is formed and if ν < m, then this reduces the dis-
crete logarithm problem in 〈φ〉 to a discrete logarithm problem in the finite
field Fq. Though it is well known that in the symmetric group Sn, acting
on n points, one can get elements with very high order. In our problem I
am actually interested in the length of the orbit formed by the action of a
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cyclic subgroup of Sn, generated by β, on the set of distinct ordered pair of
{1, 2, . . . , n}. It is known that these orbits are quite small.
Since the permutation β is easy to find from the public information φ and
φm, unless the degree of the matrix d is astronomically big, we do not have
any chance for a MOR cryptosystem which is more secure than that of the
ElGamal cryptosystem over finite fields.
Since the conjugacy problem is easy in GL(d, q), from the public infor-
mation of φ1 and φ2 one can compute the conjugator monomial matrices for
φ1 and φ2 modulo an element of the center of GL(d, q). I shall come back
to this topic later (Section 7.2) in more details.
6. STRUCTURE OF THE AUTOMORPHISM GROUP OF SL(d, q)
Let us start with a well known theorem describing the structure of the
automorphism group of SL(d, q). Let A be the group of automorphisms
generated by the diagonal and the inner automorphisms and B be the group
generated by the graph and the field automorphisms. Recall that the center
of the group GL(d, q) is the set of all scalar matrices λ1 where λ ∈ F×q and
1 is the identity matrix of degree d. I shall denote the center of GL(d, q) by
Z and the projective general linear group GL(d, q)
Z
by PGL(d, q).
A brief warning about the notation. To increase readability of the text,
from now on, the image of a under f will be denoted either by af or by
f(a). Also, I denote the conjugation of X by A as XA.
Theorem 6.1. The group A is isomorphic to PGL(d, q) and Aut(SL(d, q))
is a semidirect product of A with B.
Proof. From [2, Theorem 2.12] we know that any element in GL(d, q) is
generated by the set consisting of all invertible diagonal matrices and all
transvections. Then we can define a map ̥ : GL(d, q) → A defined by
̥(A) maps X 7→ XA, clearly ̥ is an epimorphism and Ker(̥) = Z.
From first isomorphism theorem we have that PGL(d, q) ∼= A.
We are left to show that Aut(SL(d, q)) is a semidirect product of A
with B. To prove this we need to show that A is a normal subgroup of
Aut (SL(d, q)) and Aut(SL(d, q)) = AB. Notice that any f ∈ B is an auto-
morphism of GL(d, q). With this in mind we see that for A ∈ GL(d, q) and
X ∈ SL(d, q)
XfAf
−1
= f
(
A−1f−1(X)A
)
= f(A)−1Xf(A) = Xf(A).
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This proves that A is a normal subgroup of Aut(SL(d, q)). Now notice that
for any f ∈ B, A−1XfA =
(
(A−1)f
−1
XAf
−1
)f
, where A ∈ GL(d, q).
This proves that we can move elements of B to the right of the product of
automorphisms. This proves our theorem. •
Now notice that the order ofA is actually big, it is q
d(d−1)
2 (qd−1) · · · (q−
2) but the order of B is small. The group B is the direct product of the graph
and field automorphisms. The order of B is 2γ, where γ is the degree for
the extension Fq over the prime subfield. Let γ1 = 2γ.
Let φ and φm be as in Section 2.1, then from the previous theorem φ =
Aψ1 and φm = A′ψ2, where A,A′ ∈ A and ψ1, ψ2 ∈ B. I shall consider
A ∈ A as the conjugator as well, this is clearly the case because A ∼=
PGL(d, q).
Now if φ = Aψ1, then φm = AAψ1 · · ·Aψ
m−2
1 Aψ
m−1
1 ψm1 . In this case
AAψ1 · · ·Aψ
m−2
1 Aψ
m−1
1 ∈ A and ψm1 ∈ B.
Now if γ1 < m and since the order of ψ1 divides γ1, there are r1 and
r2 such that m − 1 = k1γ1 + r1, where 0 ≤ r1 < γ1 and r2 = m
mod γ1. Then AAψ1 · · ·Aψ
m−1
1 ψm1 = A
k1
1 AA
ψ1 · · ·Aψ
r1
1 ψr21 , where A1 =
AAψ1 · · ·Aψ
γ1−1
1
. From the information of φ and φm we then have the in-
formation of ψ1 and ψr21 . For all practical purposes of implementing this
cryptosystem, the degree of the field extension cannot be too large, in this
case one can do an exhaustive search on the cosets of A and find out ψ1 and
ψr21 and do another exhaustive search to solve the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in ψ1 and find the r2. The information of r2 gives us a vital information
about the secret key m. This is clearly unacceptable. So the only way out
of this situation is not to use automorphisms from B.
Then for X ∈ SL(d, q) the automorphisms φ and φm as in Section 2.1 is
given by
φ(X) = A−1XA for some A ∈ GL(d, q)(7)
φm(X) = A′−1XA′ for some A′ ∈ GL(d, q)(8)
Now notice, in the description of the MOR protocol, we presented the auto-
morphisms as action on generators and furthermore a set of generators for
SL(d, q) are the elementary transvections.
In this case from the public information of φ and φm one can find a can-
didate for A and A′. This problem is known to be easy in GL(d, q) and is
often refereed to as the special conjugacy problem [12,13]. However, notice
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that A and A′ are not unique. For example, if A and A′ satisfy the above
equations then so will Az and A′z′ for any z, z′ ∈ Z, see Section 7.1.1.
We just saw that the only way to build a secure MOR cryptosystem using
SL(d, q) is using automorphisms from A. Henceforth, whenever we are
talking about the MOR cryptosystem, we are using the group SL(d, q) and
the automorphisms from A.
7. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED MOR CRYPTOSYSTEM
This paper is primarily focused on the discrete logarithm problem in the
automorphism group of a non-abelian group. There are two kinds of attack
on the discrete logarithm problem over finite fields. One is the generic
attack; this attack uses a black box group algorithm and the other is an
index calculus attack.
Since the black box group algorithms work in any group, they will work
in the automorphism group too, see [9, Theorem 1]. We have no way to
prevent that. On the other hand, these generic attacks are of exponential
time complexity and so is of the least concern.
The biggest computational threat to any cryptosystem using the discrete
logarithm problem is a subexponential attack like the index calculus at-
tack [15]. It is often argued [8, 16] that there is no index calculus algorithm
for most elliptic curve cryptosystems that has subexponential time complex-
ity. This fact is often presented to promote elliptic curve cryptosystem over
a finite field cryptosystem [8]. So, the best we can hope from the present
MOR cryptosystem is that there is no index calculus attack or the index
calculus attack becomes exponential.
7.1. Inner automorphisms as matrices. As it turns out the only way that a
secure MOR cryptosystem might work for the unimodular group is through
conjugation of matrices, i.e., automorphisms fromA. This MOR cryptosys-
tem can be seen as working with inner automorphisms of GL(d, q). It is well
known that the inner automorphisms work linearly on the d2-dimensional
algebra of matrices of degree d over Fq. For a fixed basis, any linear op-
erator on a vector space can be represented as a matrix. So, the discrete
logarithm problem on 〈φ〉 (Section 2.1) is now reduced to the discrete log-
arithm problem in GL(d2, q). The question is, how easy is it to solve this
discrete logarithm problem?
The best algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem in GL(k, q)
was given by Menezes and Wu [11]. In this case, the authors show that for
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X, Y ∈ GL(k, q), such that, X l = Y , l ∈ N; we can solve the discrete
logarithm problem, if χ(x) the characteristic polynomial of X , factors into
irreducible polynomials of small degree. If the characteristic polynomial
is irreducible then the discrete logarithm problem in 〈X〉 reduces to the
discrete logarithm problem in Fqk .
In our case we are working in GL(d2, q). So the characteristic polynomial
has degree d2. It is easy to see that if the characteristic polynomial is irre-
ducible then the extension of the lowest degree in which the characteristic
polynomial will split is F
qd
2 . However this is not the case, since φ(1) = 1,
1 is an eigenvalue of φ and so the best we can hope for is Fqd2−1.
7.1.1. Recovering the conjugator up to a scalar multiple. Let φ(X) =
A−1XA, where A ∈ GL(d, q). Since φ is linear, if we take X = 1 + eij ,
i 6= j; then φ(X) = A−1XA = 1 + A−1eijA. Now if we look at eijA
closely, then eijA is a matrix where the j th row of A is the ith row of eijA,
and the rest all zeros. Since A is non-singular, all the contents of any row
can not be all zeros. From this it follows that the matrix A−1eijA consists
of d columns, each of which is a constant multiple of the ith column of A−1.
One of these columns must be nonzero. Now considerA−1 (1 + ei,i+1)A−1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , d − 1, and let each Ii be a corresponding nonzero col-
umn. Then construct a d × d matrix, whose first d − 1 columns are the
columns I1, I2, . . . , Id−1 and the dth column being a nonzero column of
A−1 (1 + en1)A − 1. Then we end up with a matrix N = A−1D, where
D = [w1, w2, . . . , wd] is a diagonal matrix. Since N is known, we have
found A−1 up to a diagonal matrix.
It is obvious that N−1φ(X)N = D−1XD and hence N−1 (1 + eij)N −
1 = w−1i wjeij . Then by taking j = 1, 2, . . . , d and i = 1, we can find
w−12 w1, w
−1
3 w1, . . . , w
−1
d w1, and form the diagonal matrixD′ = [1, w1w−12 ,
w1w
−1
3 , . . . , w1w
−1
d ]. It is easy to see now that ND′ is A−1w1 and we have
found A up to a scalar multiple.
It is not hard to convince oneself that once A is found up to a scalar mul-
tiple from φ, in most cases the discrete logarithm problem in φ turns out
to be a discrete logarithm problem in A. If one recovers Ac1 and Amc2
from φ and φm, where c1, c2 ∈ F×q , then compute (Ac1)q−1 = Aq−1 and
(Amc2)
q−1 = Am(q−1) and solve the corresponding discrete logarithm prob-
lem. From Menezes-Wu [11] it is clear that this discrete logarithm problem
can have a worst case complexity of that of a discrete logarithm problem in
Fqd .
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We can stop this attack by takingA to be of order q−1. But, if the eigen-
values ofA are µ1, µ2, . . . , µd, then the eigenvalues ofAm are µm1 , µm2 , . . . , µmd .
On the other hand the eigenvalues of cA are cµ1, cµ2, . . . , cµd, c ∈ Fq.
When one recovers c1A and c2Am, c1, c2 ∈ Fq one recovers c1µ1, c1µ2, . . . , c1µd
and c2µm1 , c2µm2 , . . . , c2µmd . Then one can compute
µi
µj
and
(
µi
µj
)m
, by tak-
ing quotients. Notice that these quotients belong to Fqd . However since
there is no unique way to order the eigenvalues, one might not be able to
match a quotient with its power. Then we might have to deal with several
quotients to get to the right m. However, for all practical applications the
size of the matrix d is small and so this search is not going to cost much; on
top of that one can do this in parallel. So it is resonable to claim at this stage
that the discrete logarithm problem in φ is reduced to a discrete logarithm
problem in Fqd .
The expected asymptotic complexity of the index calculus algorithm in
Fqk is exp
(
(c+ o(1))(log qk)
1
3 (log log qk)
2
3
)
, where c is a constant, see [15]
and [8, Section 4]. If the degree of the extension, k, is greater than log2 q
then the asymptotic time complexity of the index calculus algorithm is ex-
ponential. In our case that means, if d > log2 q then the asymptotic com-
plexity of the index calculus algorithm becomes exponential.
If we choose d ≥ log2 q then this MOR cryptosystems becomes as se-
cure as the ElGamal over the elliptic curve groups, because the index cal-
culus algorithm is exponential; otherwise we can not guarantee. But on the
other hand in the proposed MOR cryptosystem encryption and decryption
works on Fq and breaking the cryptosystem depends on solving a discrete
logarithm problem on Fqd . Since, implementing the index calculus attack
becomes harder as the field gets bigger, it is clear that if we take d≪ log2 q,
then the MOR cryptosystem is much more secure than the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem over Fq.
8. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MOR CRYPTOSYSTEM
The cryptosystem we have in mind is the MOR cryptosystem (Section
2.1), the non-abelian group is SL(d, q) and the automorphisms are the auto-
morphisms fromA. In this implementation the most important thing will be
the presentation of φ and φm. We decided earlier that the presentation will
be the action of the automorphisms on a set of generators {g1, g2, . . . , gτ}.
Now we can write φ(gi) as a word in the generators g1, g2, . . . , gτ or we can
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write the product of the generators as a matrix. We choose the later, there
are two reasons for that:
: This will contain the growth in the length of the word, especially
while computing the powers of φ. That will stop any length based
attack.
: This will add to the diffusion.
The set of generators for SL(d, q) that we have in mind is the elemen-
tary transvections. It is easy to go back and forth as words in elementary
transvections and matrices using row reduction.
A big question is how to compute large powers of φ efficiently? This is
not the principal object of study for this paper and we will be brief on this
topic.
Since a set of generators are elementary transvections, computing the
power of φ can be done using only words in elementary transvections and
the image of the automorphism on these elementary transvections. This
can be done very efficiently. However, we have decided to write φm(gi)
as matrices. So, while computing the power of φ, one might have to go
back and forth between words and matrices. The objective of this exercise
is to reduce the amount of matrix multiplication, in computing the power of
φ. Also, one can use the relations among the elementary transvections to
shorten the length of the word. There are quite a few options available.
We explore one such option in more details. Assume that we are com-
puting the φm using the square and multiply algorithm [18, Algorithm 5.5].
In this algorithm one needs to multiply two group elements, in our case it
is composing two automorphisms. So, we need to find out the worst-case
complexity for multiplying two automorphisms. I further assume that the
automorphism is given as the image of (1 + ei,j), i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
the image is one d × d matrix. So for sake of notational convenience I as-
sume that we are squaring φ, where φ is given by the action on elementary
transvections. As is customary we assume that the field addition is free and
we count the number of field multiplications necessary to do the computa-
tion.
Let’s start with the matrix M such that M = φ (1 + ei,j), I shall use row
operations to write M as product of elementary transvections. We count
each row operation as d field multiplications and there are utmost d2 row
operation. So in the worst case after d3 many field multiplication we have
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written M as a product of elementary transvection. At most there are d2
many elementary transvections in the product1.
Using the relation in Equation 2, we split each transvection into product
of elementary transvections over the prime subfield. So now there are γd2
elementary transvections over the prime subfield, for each of which the im-
age under φ is known. Then the image under φ is computed and then and
then there are (p − 1)γd4 elementary transvection. The question is how to
compute the matrix corresponding to that? I propose the following:
There are utmost (p − 1)γd4 elementary transvections in the product of
φ(M). Make d equally spaced partition of the product of φ(M). Then each
one of these partitions can have utmost (p−1)γd3 elementary transvections.
Now we multiply the (p − 1)γd3 elementary transvections to get d many
matrices and them multiply these d many matrices to get the final matrix
corresponding to φ2 (1 + ei,j). Now we multiply the (p− 1)γd3 elementary
transvections linearly, one after the other, and use the relations in Equations
1 and 2. Notice that one of the components in this multiplication is an
elementary transvection. So every multiplication can take utmost d many
field multiplication. So the total complexity of multiplying (p−1)γd3 many
elementary transvections is (p − 1)γd4. Since different partitions can be
multiplied in parallel, we assume that the worst-case complexity is (p −
1)γd4 field multiplications.
Now we have to multiply the d many matrices thus obtained. We assume
that we use a straight line program to compute the product. Assuming that
matrix multiplication can be done in d3 field multiplication, we see that this
also requires d4 field multiplications. Since we can compute φ2 (1 + ei,j) in
parallel for different i and j, we claim that we can multiply two automor-
phisms with worst-case complexity (p− 1)γd4 + d4 field multiplications.
8.1. Parameters for the cryptosystem. We realized that if the conjugator
A in φ (Equation 7) is a monomial matrix then that prevents the formation of
a discrete logarithm problem in the λ of an elementary transvection 1+λei,j.
We need the inner automorphism so that the attack due to small cycle size
of the permutation in the monomial matrix can be avoided. So we have to
take the automorphism as conjugation by A ∈ GL(d, q).
1Some small examples computed by the author using GAP [6] suggests that in practice
this number is much smaller.
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The size of d and q is an open question. With the limited amount of
knowledge we have about this cryptosystem, we can only make a prelimi-
nary attempt to encourage further research. The current standard for secu-
rity in the public key cryptography is 80-bit security. This means that the
best known attack to the cryptosystem should take at least 280 steps.
The best known attack on the discrete logarithm problem in the matrices
A and A′ (Equations 7 and 8) is the generic square root attack. So we have
to ensure that to find m from A and A′ one needs at least 280 steps. For an
attack algorithm we assume that computing in Fq and in GL(d, q) takes the
same amount of time. If we assume that the order of the matrix A is the
same as the order of the field2, then the order of the field should be around
2160. So there are two choices for q, take q to be a prime of the order 2160,
i.e., a 160 bit prime; or take Fq = F2160 .
A similar situation arises with the discrete logarithm problem over the
group of an elliptic curve over a finite field. The MOV attack reduces the
discrete logarithm problem in the group of the elliptic curve over Fq to a
discrete logarithm problem in F×
qk
for some positive integer k. This is of
concern in the implementation of the elliptic curve cryptosystem, because
if k is too small then there is an subexponential attack on the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, the size of the elliptic curve
group is almost as big as the field. To prevent the square root attack the size
of the field has to be considerably higher. Once you assume that the field is
of appropriate size (2160), small k provides adequate security. Our case is
quite similar.
Koblitz et al. [8, Section 5.2] mentions that in practice k ≈ 20 is enough
for security. If we buy their argument, then it would seem that one can
choose d to be a around 20. We suspect that one might be able to go even
smaller. In our MOR cryptosystem, Menezes-Wu algorithm reduces the
discrete logarithm problem in Fqd .
So we propose d = 19, and q is as described earlier. Then we see that if
q = 2160, then we are talking about a discrete logarithm problem in F23040 .
This clearly surpasses every standard for discrete logarithm problem over
2The size of the field is motivated by the use of similar field in elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. For elliptic curves, the choice depends on the fact that the size of the group of rational
points on an elliptic curve is roughly the size of the field. In our case, there are matrices
of high order in GL(d, q). So the field can be chosen smaller, depending on the matrix we
choose to use.
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finite fields. At this size of the field, it does not matter if the index-calculus
is exponential or sub-exponential. It is simply not doable.
8.2. Generators for the cryptosystem. The question I raise in this section
is, are their better generators than the elementary transvections in SL(d, q)?
We saw that if we use the elementary transvections for a prime field, then
one needs (d2 − d) elementary transvections and (d2 − d)γ elementary
transvections for Fq where q = pγ .
This is one of the major problems in the implementation of this cryp-
tosystem. We now try to solve this problem for SL(d, p), where p is a
prime. In this MOR cryptosystem (Section 2.1), generators play a major
role. There are some properties of the generators that help. Two of them
are:
i: There should be an efficient algorithm to solve the word problem in
these generators.
ii: The less the number of generators of the group, the better is the
cryptosystem.
Albert and Thompson [1] provides us with two generators for SL(d, q).
They are
C = 1 + αed−1,2 + ed,1
D = (−1)d
(
e1,2 − e2,3 +
d∑
i=3
ei,i+1
)
where α is a primitive element of Fq. It is clear from the proof of [1, Lemma
1] that to solve the word problem in these generators one has to solve the
discrete logarithm problem in Fq. This is clearly not useful for our cause. So
we adapt the generators and extend it to show that for these generators one
can compute the elementary transvections. Since the number of generators
is 2, this gives us an advantage for the presentation of the public key and the
ciphertext over elementary transvections. However, I know of no efficient
algorithm to solve the word problem in these generators. If we can find one
such algorithm then it can be argued that this cryptosystem would become
more economical(efficient).
I now prove a theorem which is an adaptation of [1, Lemma 1]. I use the
convention used by Albert and Thomson,
ei,j = ed+i,j = ei,d+j .
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The proof of this lemma is practically identical with the proof of [1, Lemma
1]. I include a short proof for the convenience of the reader and some of the
formulas we produce in the proof are useful for implementation.
Theorem 8.1. Let
C = 1 + ed−1,2 + ed,1 and D = (−1)d
(
e1,2 − e2,3 +
d∑
i=3
ei,i+1
)
be elements of SL(d, p) where d ≥ 5. Then C and D generates SL(d, p).
Proof. Let G0 be the subgroup of SL(d, p) generated by C and D. I will
now write down a few formulas, which follow from direct computation.
For 2 ≤ k ≤ d− 2 we have
D−1 = (−1)d
(
e2,1 − e3,2 +
d∑
i=3
ei+1,i
)
(9)
C1 = D
−1CD = 1− ed,3 + e1,2(10)
CC1C
−1C−11 = 1 + ed,2(11)
Dk = (−1)dk
(
−e1,1+k − e2,2+k +
d∑
i=3
ei,i+k
)
(12)
D−k = (−1)dk
(
−e1+k,1 − e2+k,2 +
d∑
i=3
ei+k,i
)
(13)
Ck = D
−kCDk = 1− ek−1,k+2 − ek,k+1(14)
C−1k = 1 + ek−1,k+2 + ek,k+1(15)
(1 + ed,k)Ck (1− ed,k)C
−1
k = 1− ed,k+1(16)
From Equation (11) we see that 1 + ed,2 belongs to G0 and then we use
mathematical induction on k and Equation (16) proves that 1+ed,k ∈ G0 for
k = 2, . . . , d− 1. Also D−2 (1 + ed,d−1)D2 = 1 + e2,1 ∈ G0. Furthermore
[1 + ed,2, 1 + e2,1] = 1 + ed,1. This proves that 1 + ed,k ∈ G0 for k =
1, 2, . . . , d − 1. Then we can use the relations in SL(d, p) to prove that
1+ei,j ∈ G0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} and i 6= j. This proves the theorem. •
The proof of the theorem is constructive. It gives us a way to compute
the elementary transvections from these generators of Albert and Thomson;
one can use them effectively to publish the public key. There will be some
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precomputation involved to change the action of φ from these generators to
elementary transvections.
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the MOR cryptosystem for the special linear group
over finite fields. Cryptography is primarily driven by applicability. So it is
natural to ask, how efficiently can one implement this MOR cryptosystem?
How secure is the cryptosystem? I talked in details on both these issues
in Sections 8 and 7 respectively. These are often hard questions to answer
from a preliminary investigation. The worst case complexity is often far off
from the actual cost of computation and security in itself is a very elusive
concept. We now offer some realistic expectations on the computational
cost of this MOR cryptosystem when q = 2γ .
From the small experiments we did, it seems reasonable to assume that
a randomly chosen element of SL(d, q) is generated by approximately d
elementary transvections, not d2 elementary transvections. This story is
also corroborated by the proof of the previous theorem, where we show
that SL(d, p) is generated by all transvections of the form 1 + ed,k, k =
1, 2, . . . , d− 1 and by Humphries [7].
Then we need to compute the image of these d elementary transvec-
tions under the automorphism φ. For that we need to split each elemen-
tary transvections into product of elementary transvections over the ground
field using Equation 2. Then in the worst case we now have γd elementary
transvections. But since in any random binary string of length γ on aver-
age there are utmost γ
2
ones. So a more realistic expectation of the number
of transvections is γ
2
d. Using the same expectation as before the image of
these transvections under φwill be a string of γ
2
d2 elementary transvections.
Now if we use a straight line program, i.e., use the elementary transvections
to multiply the one next to it to form the matrix, then the worst case com-
plexity will be γ
2
d3 field multiplication. However, in reality that complexity
will be something like γ
2
dλ where 2 < λ ≤ 3. So it is safe to assume that
in practice λ will be around 2.5.
With all this understanding we can say that if q is a field of characteristic
2 and degree γ, then composition of two automorphisms require around
d2 +
γ
2
d2.5
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field multiplications. If we were working with a finite field Fqd , then the
naive product of two non-zero field element costs around d2 field multipli-
cations. We are quite close to that.
Lastly, I recommend that the plaintext should be an elementary transvec-
tion. It is known that trace and determinant is invariant under matrix con-
jugation. So the trace or the determinant can give out information about
the plaintext. However, if it is an elementary transvection, then the trace is
always d and the determinant 1.
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